Republican policies in practical politics: placing Sinn Féin in a European context by Doyle, John
Republican policies in practical politics: placing contemporary Sinn Féin in a 
European context 
 
John Doyle 
Centre for International Studies / School of Law and Government 
Dublin City University, Ireland 
 
Published as: “Republican policies in practical politics: placing contemporary Sinn 
Féin in a European context”, pp.131-146,  in Iseult Honohan ed.  Republicanism in 
Ireland: Confronting Theories and Traditions.  Manchester University press,  2008.  
 
Introduction 
Sinn Féin is the party most associated in public discourse with the term ‘republican’ 
in Ireland. It is also a party whose public rhetoric relies heavily on concepts at the 
core of the debates on contemporary civic republicanism. However, previous 
incarnations of the party have engaged in a static constitutionalism and an almost 
mythical idea of ‘the Republic’ and the party’s opponents view its rhetoric as skin 
deep – overlaying a more fundamental authoritarianism. As Sinn Féin is experiencing 
a period of significant development and growth, these contradictory images of the 
party need to be analysed. Therefore, without denying the legacy of republican 
thinking in other Irish political parties, this chapter analyses the contemporary 
meaning of republicanism as represented by the Sinn Féin party (North and South), 
which emerged from the ‘abstentionist’ split with elements of its old leadership in the 
late 1980s.1  
 Sinn Féin’s own self image is that its historical roots lie in the Republican 
ideal of the French revolution – as interpreted by the United Irish Movement of 1798 
and also by the republican and socialist thinking of James Connolly in the pre-1916 
period.2  Sinn Féin’s own projection of its political ideology draws on a number of 
strands from these sets of political ideas. From the French Revolutionary tradition 
Sinn Féin employs ideas of equality, secularism and, in the Irish context, 
independence from Britain and Irish unity. It would therefore follow that the party 
would have a focus on the common good and communitarian ideals – mixed with the 
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language of the ‘national’ interest or the ‘national’ community. From Connolly the 
party derives a more explicit commitment to socialism and social justice and an anti-
imperialist international position. From these revolutionary traditions and more 
directly from its own extra-parliamentary past, the party has a focus on political 
participation and activism, in politics as practice, even praxis, rather than as a purely 
elite-driven process.  
 The current developments within Sinn Féin represent an interesting study of 
wider relevance beyond Ireland. Its left-wing rhetoric, its electoral growth and entry 
into government in Northern Ireland, its high levels of activism and its strong 
nationalist agenda seem, at first glance at least, to represent a counter tendency in 
contemporary European politics. Wider debates within international relations and 
comparative politics ask a number of interesting questions which help us place 
modern Sinn Féin in a broader and international context. Firstly, the relationship 
between globalisation and nationalism is a debate with obvious relevance. Where is 
Sinn Féin placed in a typology of European nationalist parties and how does it 
articulate its nationalism in an era of globalisation?  Secondly, the 1990s can be 
characterised as seeing a rush to the centre by many parties of the broad left, as 
they sought to win wider support after the crises caused by the perceived failure of 
Keynesian economics in the 1970s, and the fall-out of the collapse of Soviet style 
communism. Traditional ‘republican’ values of the left such as equality were 
sidelined, in this context, as individual and consumer rights were promoted as the 
basis for a new individualistic citizenship. As it grows, is Sinn Féin following this 
trend?  Thirdly, has the peace process or the growth of the party led to a weakening 
of its policy on Irish unity?  Finally, declining voter turnout and low levels of 
engagement with mainstream political parties are now a feature of most wealthy 
democracies. Parties with a high level of voluntary activism are a rarity – largely 
confined to those with low levels of support. As Sinn Féin grows, is it leaving behind 
its activist based extra-parliamentary past?   
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 To clarify the issues involved, this paper examines four interrelated aspects of 
the party’s current political strategy:  How does the party deal with the - at least 
potentially conflicting - pressures of republican thought and nationalist ideology in an 
era of globalisation and in the context of rising xenophobia in Europe? Has the peace 
process moderated Sinn Féin’s fundamental position on the question of Irish unity? 
Has the party moved to the political centre as it has grown?  Has the tradition of 
activism and participation within the party declined since the IRA ceasefires, as a 
new generation of members join? 
 
Globalisation and nationalism 
 
As a nationalist party Sinn Féin faces particular challenges in an era of globalisation 
and European integration. Critics of nationalist political movements – in particular 
authors such as Hobsbawm and Kaldor - have placed nationalism in opposition to 
cosmopolitanism and global fraternity, indeed at times in opposition to modernity 
itself.3  How has Sinn Féin sought to reconcile its nationalism with its republicanism 
and internationalism in this regard?   
 Despite the tendency in the critical literature to treat all nationalist parties as 
variants on the Milosevic regime in Serbia, at least three types of ‘nationalist’ party 
can been seen in Europe at present.  
 Clearly there are ‘nationalist’ parties in Europe of the far-right, for example the 
Front Nationale or the British National Party, who reject the concept of a non-ethnic 
national identity, and who have sought to mobilise on a platform of racism, playing on 
communities’ fears in a period of societal change. While they lack the trappings of 
fascism, the British Conservative Party is in many respects a state-nationalist party of 
this tradition, with an increasing proportion of their political platform now devoted to 
issues of migration, British (or indeed English) nationalism and anti-European Union 
rhetoric.4
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 This is not the only model of politically organised nationalism in Europe. The 
Scottish National Party and the moderate Catalan and Basque nationalists5 have 
provided a more civic oriented model of nationalism which is capable of a positive 
engagement with citizenship in a multi-ethnic society. This group clearly does not 
belong to the far right. They vary in their political ideology and in their commitment to 
economic equality but tend to take a positive view of European integration, at least 
since the 1980s, and a reasonably benign view of globalisation.6    
 Thirdly there are those who have placed their nationalism in the context of the 
anti-corporate globalisation movement asserting a nationalist vision in contrast to the 
centralising tendencies of globalisation and regional integration. Sinn Féin seeks to 
place itself in this context. It is an active participant in the “anti-globalisation” 
movement. The party calls for the cancellation of third world debt, increased 
development aid and the introduction of the Tobin Tax, and Sinn Féin MEP Bairbre 
de Brún addressed the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil in January 2005 
on the issue of privatisation and globalisation. The party also remains highly sceptical 
of European Integration, opposing the centralising tendencies of EU law-making and 
accusing the EU of prioritising market integration over social equality.7   
 On migration – the key defining issue for right wing nationalist parties in 
Europe at present - Sinn Féin has explicitly rejected an ethnic model of 
republicanism. They, along with the Green Party  were the first political parties to 
oppose the Irish government’s plans for a referendum limiting the right to citizenship, 
and immediately announced they would campaign for a NO vote.8  The party’s 
manifesto’s for elections at all levels North and South since 2001 contain explicit anti-
racist elements. In addition they called for an amnesty for asylum seekers already 
within the system and for the right to work ,9 and for the retention of an automatic 
right to Irish citizenship for children born in the country. The party has also had a 
strong position on the rights of the Irish traveller community since at least the 1980s, 
and calls for the recognition of travellers as an ethnic group.10  Even if critics of the 
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party are dismissive of their policy rhetoric, there is no doubt that Sinn Féin does not 
campaign on a far-right vision of nationalism, but aligns itself publicly with anti-racist 
organisations. 
 On the wider issues raised by the public debates on globalisation, Sinn Féin 
is highly critical of the global economic system and of the dominant role of the USA, 
despite the considerable significance which they attach to a strategic involvement 
with the United States - with Irish American groups, Congress and the Administration 
- regarding the peace process. The party was very active in the anti-war movement 
on Iraq – providing speakers for all of the major rallies and opposing the use of 
Shannon airport by the US military; and they have a highly critical position of US 
foreign policy in the Middle East in particular.11  Inevitably these policy positions are 
used against them in the USA but there is no evidence that the party has sought to 
distance itself from these policies or reduce their profile. Neither is there any 
evidence that the party feels itself under pressure to do so from its support base.  
 There was, for example, considerable debate about Gerry Adams’s visit to 
Cuba in 2001 and his very public and friendly reception by Fidel Castro. Supporters 
of the peace process in the US Congress were very vocal in their attacks on the 
visit.12 Despite this, Sinn Féin not only proceeded with the visit, but promoted it 
heavily via their press office. Furthermore they also went ahead with a visit to the 
Basque country in January 2002, despite the collapse of the peace process there.13 
The 2002 general election manifesto showed no sign that the party was concerned 
that their position on Cuba was a problem for them, and they explicitly called for an 
end to the United States embargo of Cuba.14
 The one area in this regard where the party’s policy is clearly in a state of flux 
is with regard to the European Union. On issues of social protection and regulation 
Sinn Féin is clearly closer to Berlin (or indeed Paris) than Boston. In a neo-liberal era 
the EU has the scale to avoid being dragged in a rush to the bottom, even if the 
current Lisbon agenda has elements of that economic model in its strategic vision. 
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Sinn Féin is unclear however as to whether it would welcome a more consciously 
social democratic EU even if such were possible, or whether it would see such a 
move as a violation of national sovereignty (even if in reality small states have never 
been able to exercise such sovereignty in a global economy).  
 For example, the party’s 2004 EU manifesto says that the Lisbon Agenda 
mid-term review in 2005 should  
end the almost exclusive focus on competitiveness and privatisation and 
refocus on the original balance with sustainable economic development, full 
employment and social protections’ and later says ‘increased tax-take from 
“more and better jobs” must result in better provision of public services such 
as healthcare, education, and transport -- the Lisbon Agenda must work 
towards setting minimum standards for state provision and must not result in 
any erosion of public services.  
 
However it then goes on to say that ‘Sinn Féin MEPs will campaign for the restoration 
of economic sovereignty’, that ‘member state governments should retain complete 
control over taxation policy and strategy’ and that the primacy of member states to 
develop their own economic policy must be re-instated’. The party is very clear that 
EU competition policy should be amended to allow individual member-states use 
more state aid to industry and allow more proactive public sector enterprises. They 
are less clear however as to whether EU policy should allow an individual state to 
pursue a policy of very low taxation, low labour costs, poor labour standards and low 
social services and still have full access to the EU market place. Certainly they seem 
to oppose the imposition even of social protection from Brussels. 
 Similarly, on issues of European Security, Sinn Féin is very explicit in 
opposing any military role for the EU whatsoever. It opposes the use of regional 
organisations for peace-keeping except under explicit UN mandates. It does call for 
UN reform but does not engage with the debate on what should be done if UN reform 
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does not happen. It simply says that military power and defence should be left to 
individual states and peacekeeping to the UN. It does not engage with the debate as 
to whether a counter weight to US military capacity in the limited arena of crisis 
management and peace-keeping would be a positive development globally as a 
balancing force with a more multilateral ethos. EU security and defence policy, 
indeed EU common foreign and security policy, is simply dismissed as another 
attempt to form a superstate with military capacity.  
 If Sinn Féin’s critique of globalisation and European integration is vague at 
times it is perhaps no more so that the ‘anti-global capital’ movement more generally. 
As the party grows they will be forced to develop more explicit and specific policies, 
which deal with the contradictions in their approach to the EU and which tackle 
thorny questions such as the impact on Irish farmers of a fairer trade regime for the 
poorest countries in the world. However, whatever policy weaknesses and 
contradictions there may be, Sinn Féin in clearly not an ethnic-nationalist party in the 
model of the European right. They have a clear anti-racist position and call for a 
softening of immigration laws, not further restrictions. They have sought to wed the 
party’s politics to the global anti-establishment movement, most explicitly in 
opposition to the war in Iraq, but also on global trade, the environment etc. They 
have also pursued this agenda even when other party priorities around the peace 
process might have led to a softly-softly approach towards the US administration.  
 
Moving to the centre? 
 
Sinn Féin’s public support base has radically increased since the 1994 IRA ceasefire.  
It continues to grow within Northern Ireland, but seemed to hit a plateau in the 2007 
general election in the republic (discussed further below).  For details see Tables 9.1 
and 9.2 below.  
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 Table 9.1 Elections in Northern Ireland – percentage support for Sinn Féin 
2007 
Assembly 
2005  
General 
2004 
EU 
2003 
Assembly 
2001  
General 
1999  
EU 
1998 
Ass. 
1997  
Genera
l 
1996 
Forum
1992  
Genera
l  
26.2 24.3 26.3 23.5 21.7 17.3 17.6 16.1 15.5 10.0 
 
Table 9.2 Elections in the Republic of Ireland – percentage support for Sinn Féin 
2007 
General 
2004   
EU 
2002 
General 
1999 
EU 
1997  
General 
1994 
EU 
6.9 11.1 6.5 6.3 2.6 3.0 
 
As Sinn Féin has grown and become more successful we might have expected to 
see the party shift towards the centre in its political perspectives. Without rejecting 
the importance of other dimensions, policy on Irish unity and issues of economic 
policy, public services and social inclusion have been important elements of Irish 
party competition. Sinn Féin has represented the strongest nationalist position on 
Irish unity, and has also, since the 1980s, articulated a strongly leftist rhetoric on 
economic and social policy. If there is a tendency to moderation in their political 
programme, it ought to be most visible on these two domains. 
 There is, however, very little evidence that Sinn Féin has moved to the centre 
in its broad political perspective as its support has grown. Michael Laver, in an expert 
survey of party policy positions, measured Sinn Féin’s policy position on a range of 
economic, social and environmental scales.15 The party was placed furthest to the 
left on economic policy – measured as a policy commitment to public spending 
(compared to all still existing parties) – both in 1992 (before the ceasefires) and again 
in 1997. In an update of this survey in 2002-3 the party was actually placed further to 
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the left by respondents in terms of this policy dimension.16  Interestingly, when 
academic experts are asked to label parties as ‘left-wing’, the Greens become the 
most left wing party,, despite the Green Party’s traditional disavowal of the term.  
 ‘Expert’ surveys are obviously reliant on the views of the academics 
concerned. In Laver’s 2002 study, the respondents, when asked to compare the 
parties in totality to their own position, put Sinn Féin on average the furthest away (a 
score of 15.69 out of a  20,  marking that party furthest from the respondent’s own 
views). This was interestingly (from the point of view of studying academics 
themselves rather than political parties) second only to the Progressive Democrats 
and Fianna Fail at an average score of approximately 13 each.17  The results from 
Laver’s study are, moreover, confirmed by other sources. For example, The Irish 
Times, in its coverage of Sinn Féin’s manifesto launch for the 2002 general election 
in the Republic of Ireland, ran two headlines:  ‘Sinn Féin plans higher taxes for rich 
and businesses’ and ‘Party lays out surprisingly detailed left-wing vision’.18 
 An analysis of the Sinn Féin manifestos provides a rich source of material, as 
the party has fought a very large number of elections in recent years – general 
elections in 1997, 2002 and 2007 in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland 
Assembly elections in 1998, 2003 and 2007, Northern Ireland Forum elections in 
1996, Westminster elections in 1997, 2002 and 2005, EU Parliament elections (North 
and South) in 1994, 1999 and 2004, in addition to local council elections. It is beyond 
the space limitations of this chapter to provide a comprehensive content analysis of 
the manifestos over time or to make  comparisons with those of other European 
leftwing parties. However, a few key points are clear from an analysis of the texts.19  
Firstly, there is a strong consistency over time – there has been no discernible policy 
shift as measured on a left-right axis in the economic and social arena. There is a 
strong and traditional left-wing framework to the manifestos which promotes greater 
public spending in areas such as education, health and housing, advocates stronger 
local government, environmental protection and rural regeneration and which 
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prioritises social inclusion and equality. For example, the party calls for universal 
health care, free at the point of use, and increased capital gains taxes, and focuses 
on greater levels of public spending over tax cuts.20  Secondly, there are often quite 
detailed ‘community level’ level policies, often reflecting the party’s involvement in 
localised campaigns on issues such as  waste incinerators, housing and drugs. 
Thirdly, the macro economic frameworks in particular are occasionally highly 
generalised. They have become a little more specific over time – perhaps in 
response to the growing number of elected representatives and to the party’s brief 
experience in government in Northern Ireland. However, they remain much less 
specific than the community level policies, in particular in crucial areas such as 
taxation, fiscal policy and industrial development. 
 Apart from their focus on the peace process and Irish unity, discussed in the 
next section, the party’s strongest macro-ideological framework is provided by the 
concept of ‘equality’. The party has also begun to use the language of ‘equality’ as 
encapsulating its political programme in recent years. They have used the phrase 
‘Building an Ireland of Equals’ as their overall policy document and as a manifesto 
title in 2002;   ‘A budget for an Ireland of equals’ as their pre-budget submission 
2003, ‘Governing equally for all’ as their programme for Government in the North, 
and ‘An Ireland of Equals in a Europe of Equals’ as the title of their EU manifesto in 
2004, the 2007 manifesto sub-heads refer to ‘Equal Access to World Class Public 
Services’  etc. Just as Sinn Féin promoted the word ’peace’ in their rhetoric during 
the early 1990s, they now use the concept of equality as a macro-frame. This is 
consciously linked to redistribution of wealth nationally and to concepts of global 
equality. It is also clearly a concept based on equality of outcomes, not just a 
legalistic ‘equality of opportunity’. Many of the current senior party leadership became 
politically active around the time of the civil rights protests in the 1960s, and the  
weakness of early ‘fair employment’ policy, based on ideas of ‘equality of opportunity’ 
without targets and timescales for change, has had an impact on party policy. Sinn 
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Féin was also very involved in the US based ‘McBride Principles’ campaign on fair 
employment and in agitating for strengthened fair employment legislation in the late 
1980s. This led to significant policy discussion within the party as to what was 
required to alter the underlying higher rates of unemployment in the nationalist 
community, and these perspectives now influence wider equality policy around 
issues of gender, race and class.  
 Clearly Sinn Féin has not been tested in government in the Republic of 
Ireland and has had a very limited experience in the North. There is also clear 
evidence of a high level of pragmatism in the party’s actions. For example, the party 
opposed public-private partnership funding models in education, but Martin 
McGuinness as Minister for Education in Northern Ireland did not block the building 
of new schools in public-private partnership projects where the alternative would 
have been no building at all. Likewise party councillors have voted for estimates, 
including service charges on some councils where the alternative was abolition, 
despite opposing them as a form of taxation.  
 
 While the Party’s  economic policy is framed in a highly generalised way as 
prioritising greater social equality, it lacks specifics in many key areas and has in 
some respects not moved on from their policies in the 1980s. While the logic of the 
party’s spending plans requires an increase in taxation levels (from some sector of 
society), the party leader Gerry Adams was very reluctant to be specific in a pre-
election address to the Dublin Chamber of Commerce in 2004, and the party’s last 
general election manifesto for the Republic of Ireland promised only a review. This 
will be a pivotal point in the party’s development and will determine their medium 
term commitment to radical republican ideology. 
 The 2007 general election in the Republic was a disappointing result for Sinn 
Fein, by their own admission.  Their vote only marginally increased from the 2002 
result, despite a widespread belief, supported by pre-election polls that they would do 
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much better.  The reasons for their poor result are complex and include reasons 
outside of the party’s own control.  The election saw the smallest level of support for 
small parties and independents in many years – with an aggregate loss of 16 seats - 
the Green Party also failed to make any gains and the Socialist Party lost its only 
seat. The final weeks of the campaign saw a very singular focus on the formation of a 
government and the selection of Taoiseach.  The Labour Party’s decision to enter a 
pre-election pact with Fine Gael, reduced that choice effectively two blocs and all 
those outside those two bloc’s saw their position marginalised.   
There are however issues specific to Sinn Fein which may explain at least 
part of their poor result.  There was a lot of media coverage in the final week of the 
campaign of the party leader’s relatively poor performance in two high profile 
television appearances.  As the peace process has settled down and the era of 
conflict receded, media interviews shifted from their traditional focused on the IRA 
and we saw the first detailed discussion of the parties wider economic policies.  The 
criticism of Adam’s TV appearances focused on his perceived weaknesses on the 
detail of tax and economic policy – reflecting not his personal ability as a TV 
performer but the relatively underdeveloped nature of the party’s policy in this area 
as discussed above.  While there were many attacks from its opponents on the 
party’s left wing rhetoric and some confusion over its policy on corporation tax it was 
the lack of clarity and lack of depth of analysis in its economic policy rather than the 
extent of its left wing vision which was at issue and which may have damaged the 
party.  
 Sinn Fein entered a power-sharing government in Northern Ireland in May 
2007 with Martin McGuinness taking the post of Deputy First Leader and the party 
also gained three other senior Ministerial posts.  At time of writing however it is too 
early to analyse the impact of being in government on the party’s economic and 
social policy.  Partly this is a question of time, but in addition because the Northern 
Ireland executive does not have full fiscal authority, Sinn Féin can continue to 
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demand significant public spending without being required to develop a 
complementary tax policy.  The lack of development of party policy on economics is 
therefore a much more telling problem in the South than it is in the North.   
 Clearly we cannot know what Sinn Féin would do in a future Coalition 
government in the Republic where they had full fiscal powers, not yet available in 
Northern Ireland. However what is clear is that they have not, to date, abandoned 
previous left wing economic policies as part of their strategy to win new voters. Their 
recent success is not based on or linked to a moderation of the party’s social and 
economic policies.   
 
Nationalism and Irish unity 
 
The second broad area where the issue of policy moderation needs to be examined 
is  the question of Irish unity. Literature on comparative peace processes has raised 
the question as to whether militant parties involved in peace-processes are 
‘entrapped’ by the process, effectively diluting their original demands as part of the 
inevitable compromises in political talks. Hard-line positions on core values are a 
crucial mobilisation tool in periods of intense conflict, but in a period of compromise 
and negotiation they may be abandoned. In the Irish context,  Paul Bew has 
suggested that, by accepting the principle of consent, Sinn Féin and Irish nationalism 
more generally has effectively abandoned the demand for Irish unity in all practical 
respects in return for internal reform within Northern Ireland and North–South links.21  
This is also the premise of Ed Moloney in his recent history of the IRA when he 
characterises the 1998 Agreement as a trade-off, with unionists getting constitutional 
security and nationalists getting justice and reform.22  It is clear that the majority of 
Ulster Unionists are not at all certain that the constitutional future of Northern Ireland 
is secure within the UK, and do not accept that issues of internal reform are so 
readily separated from and traded for constitutional security.23  There has been less 
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exploration of where Sinn Féin sees its current position on Irish unity. 
 This raises a related question about the nature of Sinn Féin in particular as a 
party operating in two separate jurisdictions with different competitors in the two party 
systems and, to some extent at least, different priorities among their potential 
electorates. It is suggested in Brian Feeney’s otherwise excellent historical study of 
Sinn Féin that the party operates two different political programmes – with a focus on 
Irish unity, British injustice and human rights issues in the North, and a focus on 
community politics and social and economic issues in the South.24  An analysis of 
Sinn Féin manifestos in recent elections suggests that, despite this being a common 
perception, it is not actually the case. All manifestoes issued by the party in recent 
years have had wide ranging content. In all manifestos issued in the North a clear 
majority of the document related to social, environmental and economic issues not 
directly linked to the question of partition and related human rights issues. The 2003 
Assembly election for example has 60 pages out of 93 covering social and economic 
issues not directly related to the conflict, the peace process or Irish unity. An analysis 
of press releases issued by Sinn Féin in November 2003 (the month of the Assembly 
election) shows a very wide range of issues raised. 25   Presumably the party focused 
in press releases on those issues they thought were crucial to mobilising and winning 
votes, and this indicates that the party press office (at least) believes that a wide 
range of policies are important to their voters and potential voters. Also in that 
election, considerable coverage in the Irish News and statements issued by their 
nationalist rivals the SDLP concerned the performance of the two Sinn Féin ministers 
Martin McGuinness and Bairbre De Brún. 
 Likewise manifestos issued in the South generally begin with and devote 
considerable space to Irish unity and related human rights questions. In fact the 
nature of the content on Irish unity actually became more specific between the 1997 
and 2002 elections, and the 2007 manifesto again began with a substantive section 
on what should be done to advance progress towards Irish unity. In addition to 
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promoting the party’s role in the peace process, the 2007 manifesto calls for a Green 
paper on Irish unity, the creation of a Minister of State with responsibility for 
coordinating all-Ireland aspects of each departments work, and representation from 
Northern Irland to be introduced in the Houses of the Oireachtas.  
 To see the party as essentially two separate political projects is to 
misunderstand their political programme in the South. The development of the peace 
process and its relative success is not seen by the party as an irrelevancy in Dublin’s 
working class communities, but as a positive addition to Sinn Féin’s community 
activism and social radicalism. The peace process gives the party a ‘can-do’ image at 
a time when the ability of politics to deliver is questioned by many. The attacks on 
Sinn Féin’s relationship with the IRA may lose them some votes but is also used to 
promote the party’s anti-establishment image. Martin Ferris TD was the focus of very 
intense media attacks for his previous arrests for IRA gun-running and was also 
accused of being involved in attacks on drug dealers and criminals, but he went on to 
be easily elected in 2002 and re-elected in 2007.  The challenge for Sinn Fein will be 
to hold and increase this support base when the high profile coverage and  novelty of 
the peace process recedes 
 In broad terms Sinn Féin are also tapping into a key element of Irish political 
culture – and in practical terms they are winning votes from the more nationalist 
supporters of Fianna Fáil and Labour. The electoral appeal of Sinn Féin’s nationalism 
in the Republic of Ireland is however hard to quantify. Opinion polls asking voters to 
rank the most important issues in a given election do not necessarily capture long 
term ideological and cultural influences of nationalism. For example a person asked 
to identify the most important issues in a given election may well say ‘health’ if that is 
the dominant media debate, even if they personally always vote Sinn Féin because 
of their nationalist stance. Two recent political events not directly related to Sinn 
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Féin’s electoral successes also suggest an ongoing electoral relevance for issues 
around Irish unity and nationalism.  
 In the 1997 Presidential election campaign there were very strident attacks on 
the subsequent President Mary McAleese. It was suggested that she was close to 
Sinn Féin and therefore an unsuitable candidate. As she had previously stood for 
election for Fianna Fáil while living in Dublin, and was a public supporter of the SDLP 
while living in Northern Ireland, the attacks were seen by many commentators as 
raising a question mark over the suitability of any northern nationalist to hold the 
office. The nature of  these attacks was rejected by a majority of the public,26 and the 
high-profile debate was the beginning of McAleese’s climb in the opinion polls.27  The 
1997 general election also saw the highest percentage of respondents highlighting 
Northern Ireland as the most important issue in the general election in recent years – 
and this, along with the questioning of Fine Gael’s ability to manage the peace 
process, a potentially key issue for marginal and floating voters in that election was 
enough to make a difference in a tight election.28  Certainly the two major candidates 
in the following Fine Gael leadership race sought to position themselves in the Peter 
Barry or even Michael Collins mould of constitutional nationalism, rather than the 
more neutralist tradition (as between nationalism and unionism) advocated by John 
Bruton as leader. Indeed in the 2002 general election Fine Gael went to considerable 
lengths to avoid any public disagreement with the government on Northern Ireland 
policy and effectively neutralised it as an issue.29
 Certainly the  Sinn Féin leadership is committed to the peace process. In that 
regard that is a clear moderation from previous positions while the IRA campaign 
was ongoing. However the party is equally committed to the pursuit of Irish unity, and 
it sees that as important to its political project in the Republic as well as Northern 
Ireland. Its manifestos, press releases and website clearly prioritise the party’s role in 
the peace process and their commitment to Irish unity. There clearly is a relationship 
between the party’s electoral growth and the IRA ceasefire and peace process, but 
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Sinn Féin continues to see the pursuit of Irish unity as the central core of their 
political programme and their appeal 
 
Participation and activism 
 
The literature on political parties across Western Europe highlights a reduction in 
recent years in levels of political participation, electoral turnout, voluntary activism 
and a shift to smaller, full-time professional, media oriented parties, where 
membership is largely a formal affair involving a limited practical commitment to work 
for the party other than at election time.30  Media coverage of Sinn Féin’s election 
campaigns, especially the ‘colour’ pieces on individual candidates canvassing, often 
refer to the Sinn Féin ‘machine’ and to the large numbers of party activists working 
for the party - many of them travelling from the Republic to Northern Ireland and vice 
versa when an election is taking place in only one jurisdiction.31  There is also a more 
general awareness of the party’s high profile community activism. The extent of this 
activism and its divergence from wider European trends of reduced participation has 
been not been examined rigorously, but anecdotal evidence from interviews with 
party members suggests that party members have a very high level of activism. They 
attend regular cumann (branch) meetings (usually weekly), they typically take part in 
at least one other piece of activity per week – such as a protest, attending a 
community meeting or involvement in local campaigns and groups. The scale of 
activity of some members is very intense. It is not that other parties do not have hard 
working officials and elected representatives (they obviously do). What is different 
however is that this level of activism is visible in ’ordinary’ party members in Sinn 
Féin.  
 The other interesting result from this work was the scale of internal party 
activity designed to provide forums for members, and in many cases more active 
supporters to meet with members of the party leadership to discuss party strategy 
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and the peace process. Interviews with figures from the leadership and journalistic 
accounts of the peace process attest to the scale of the effort put in by the party to 
running what they call ‘republican family’ meetings. These have taken place 
throughout the country at every major juncture of the process and give the party 
leadership a very strong sense of what their support base is willing to take in terms of 
political compromise, while allowing party members and supporters a regular channel 
for debate, and allowing the party leadership explain the process and their strategy to 
their support base. These were consciously intended to avert the types of splits 
which Sinn Féin has experienced historically. 
 Finally, Sinn Féin’s Ard Fheis (party conference) is also unusual for the 
influence it still has on party policy. While inevitably used by the leadership to 
maximise positive coverage, it retains for party members its constitutional function of 
making policy. The nature of the debates and the number of motions passed at a 
typical Ard Fheis reflect an institution with significant power and authority. It is also 
not unusual for the Ard Fheis to reject leadership perspectives on at least one issue 
per year.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Responding to the four questions asked at the beginning of this paper, it is clear that 
Sinn Féin has explicitly rejected an anti-immigrant, xenophobic form of nationalism. It 
is consciously seeking to place its nationalism in the context of the anti-globalisation 
movement, bringing together its previous anti-colonial rhetoric with the concerns of 
the modern global solidarity movement, such as fair trade and development, anti-
racism and the environment. However unlike many of the organisations in the broad 
anti-global capital movement Sinn Féin is also a political party with significant 
influence on some local councils and with a brief experience of government in 
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Northern Ireland. It remains to be tested in how this broad political approach could be 
reflected in the more concrete policy programmes required by a political party.  
 Secondly, Sinn Féin continues to place a high priority on Irish unity in its 
political campaigning and publicity North and South. Signing up to the Good Friday 
Agreement has not resulted in Irish unity being de-prioritised in its publicity and 
manifestos. Rather the peace process seems to have given Sinn Féin a platform - for 
a period at least- to promote their longer term political project. Irish unity therefore 
remains a central mobilising project for the party. 
 Thirdly, on social and economic equality, the party’s rhetoric remains left-wing 
in its focus and emphasises a commitment to a high level of equality in society. It 
also uses the language of ‘equality’ as its central macro policy framework. There is 
no evidence of a rush to the political centre. The party faces a challenge, however, 
as it grows to develop in particular more specific economic policies,  which could 
deliver such equality. This will be a challenge, especially if the party is involved in 
pragmatic coalition government formation at national or local level 
 Fourthly, the party has retained a high level of party activism and participation 
by members and even supporters in the activity and internal meetings of the party. It 
seems to have maintained this level of voluntary commitment from ‘ordinary’ party 
members even as the number of its elected representatives grows. 
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